Section 102.01. Definitions.

 

(1)  This chapter may be referred to as the “Worker's Compensation Act" and allowances, recoveries and liabilities under this chapter constitute “Worker's Compensation".

(2)  In this chapter:

(ad) “Administrator" means the administrator of the division of hearings and appeals in the department of administration.

(af) “Commission" means the labor and industry review commission.

(ag) “Commissioner" means a member of the commission.

(am) “Compensation" means worker's compensation.

(ap) “Department" means the department of workforce development.

(ar) “Division" means the division of hearings and appeals in the department of administration.

(bm) “General order" means such order as applies generally throughout the state to all persons, employments, places of employment or public buildings, or all persons, employments or places of employment or public buildings of a class under the jurisdiction of the department. All other orders of the department shall be considered special orders.

(c) “Injury" means mental or physical harm to an employee caused by accident or disease, and also means damage to or destruction of artificial members, dental appliances, teeth, hearing aids and eyeglasses, but, in the case of hearing aids or eyeglasses, only if such damage or destruction resulted from accident which also caused personal injury entitling the employee to compensation therefor either for disability or treatment.

(d) “Local governmental unit" means a political subdivision of this state; a special purpose district or taxing jurisdiction, as defined in s. 70.114 (1) (f) , in this state; an instrumentality, corporation, combination, or subunit of any of the foregoing; or any other public or quasi-public corporation.

(dm) “Order" means any decision, rule, regulation, direction, requirement, or standard of the department or the division, or any other determination arrived at or decision made by the department or the division.

(e) “Primary compensation and death benefit" means compensation or indemnity for disability or death benefit, other than increased, double or treble compensation or death benefit.

(eg) “Religious sect" means a religious body of persons, or a division of a religious body of persons, who unite in holding certain special doctrines or opinions concerning religion that distinguish those persons from others holding the same general religious beliefs.

(em) “Secretary" means the secretary of workforce development.

(f) “Temporary help agency" means an employer who places its employee with or leases its employees to another employer who controls the employee's work activities and compensates the first employer for the employee's services, regardless of the duration of the services.

(g) Except as provided in s. 102.555 with respect to occupational deafness, “time of injury", “occurrence of injury", or “date of injury" means:

1. In the case of accidental injury, the date of the accident which caused the injury.

2. In the case of disease, the date of disability or, if that date occurs after the cessation of all employment that contributed to the disability, the last day of work for the last employer whose employment caused disability.

(gm) “Wisconsin compensation rating bureau" means the bureau provided for in s. 626.06 .

(h) “Uninsured employer" means an employer that is in violation of s. 102.28 (2) .

(j) “Uninsured employers fund" means the fund established under s. 102.80 (1) .

(jm) “Uninsured employer surcharge" means the surcharge under s. 102.85 (4) .

(k) “Workweek" means a calendar week, starting on Sunday and ending on Saturday.

In an occupational disease claim, the examiner may find the date of injury to be other than the last day of work. Royal-Globe Insurance Co. v. DILHR, 82 Wis. 2d 90 , 260 N.W.2d 670 (1978).

An intentionally inflicted injury, unexpected and unforeseen by the injured party, is an accident under sub. (2) (c). Jenson v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co. 161 Wis. 2d 253 , 468 N.W.2d 1 (1991).

Cessation of employment under sub. (2) (g) 2. does not require that the employee no longer be employed, but requires that the employee no longer be employed in the employment that contributed to the disability. If that is the case, the employer that caused the injury is responsible. North River Insurance Co. v. Manpower Temporary Services, 212 Wis. 2d 63 , 568 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2000 .

LIRC's determination of “scope of employment" is given great weight deference. Whether an agency's determination is given great weight depends on whether it has experience in interpreting a particular statutory scheme and not on whether it has ruled on the specific facts. Town of Russell Volunteer Fire Department v. LIRC, 223 Wis. 2d 723 , 589 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1998), 98-0734 .

Sub. (2) (g) sets the date of injury of an occupational disease, and s. 102.42 (1) provides that medical expenses incurred before an employee knows of the work-related injury are compensable. Read together, medical expenses in occupational disease cases are not compensable until the date of injury, but once the date is established all expenses associated with the disease, even if incurred before the date of injury, are compensable. United Wisconsin Insurance Co. v. LIRC, 229 Wis. 2d 416 , 600 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1999), 97-3776 .

Sub. (2) (g) 2. does not represent a comprehensive statement of a claimant's burden of proof nor does it abrogate the requirement of s. 102.03 (1) (e) that the claimant must prove that the injury arose out of employment. It merely sets out a mechanism for fixing the time, occurrence, or date of an injury for purposes of identifying the proper employer against whom a claim may be made. White v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 244 , 239 Wis. 2d 505 , 620 N.W.2d 442 , 00-0855 .

In the case of disease, the date of disability under sub. (2) (g) 2. was the date when the employee could no longer work, not when he first underwent an employer-required medical examination. Virginia Surety Co., Inc. v. LIRC, 2002 WI App 277 , 258 Wis. 2d 665 , 654 N.W.2d 306 , 02-0031 .

A company in the business of loaning employees was not a “temporary help agency" under sub. (2) (f) when that company placed an employee with another employer who paid the loaning company, but without the loaning company's knowledge assigned the employee to a third company. The statute requires that the employee is placed by the temporary help agency to the employer who will supervise that work. M. M. Schranz Roofing, Inc. v. First Choice Temporary, 2012 WI App 9 , 338 Wis. 2d 420 , 809 N.W.2d 880 , 11-0345 .