1981 c. 280
;
1985 a. 275
;
1987 a. 332
,
380
,
399
,
403
;
1989 a. 121
;
1991 a. 269
;
1993 a. 219
,
227
,
486
;
1995 a. 456
;
1997 a. 237
;
2001 a. 16
,
109
;
2003 a. 196
,
279
,
326
;
2005 a. 60
,
276
,
277
;
2007 a. 80
,
97
,
116
;
2009 a. 203
;
2011 a. 271
,
282
;
2013 a. 165
,
167
;
2015 a. 121
,
366
.
While courts have no duty to secure informed waivers of possible statutory defenses when accepting a guilty plea, under the unique facts of the case, the defendant was entitled to withdraw a guilty plea to a charge barred by the statute of limitations. State v. Pohlhammer,
82 Wis. 2d 1
,
260 N.W.2d 678
(1978).
Sub. (3) tolls the running of statutes of limitation during the period in which a defendant is not a state resident and violates neither the privileges and immunities clause nor the equal protection clause of the U.S. constitution. State v. Sher,
149 Wis. 2d 1
,
437 N.W.2d 878
(1989).
A person is not “publicly a resident within this state" under sub. (3) when living outside the state but retaining state residence for voting and tax purposes. State v. Whitman,
160 Wis. 2d 260
,
466 N.W.2d 193
(Ct. App. 1990).
An arrest warrant is issued for purposes of sub. (1) when it is signed by a judge with the intent that it be executed and leaves the possession of the judge. That the warrant is never executed is irrelevant. State v. Mueller,
201 Wis. 2d 121
,
549 N.W.2d 455
(Ct. App. 1996),
93-3227
.
The statute of limitations for a continuing offense does not run until the last act is done, which, viewed alone, is a crime. Otherwise, a prosecution for a felony offense must be commenced within 6 years. State v. Miller,
2002 WI App 197
, 257 Wis. 2d. 124,
650 N.W.2d 850
,
01-1406
.
When the jury found the defendant guilty of having sexual contact with the minor victim during the period outside the statute of limitations, but also found that the victim was unable to seek the issuance of a complaint due to the effects of the sexual contact or due to statements or instructions by the defendant, the statute of limitations was tolled under sub. (4). The jury was required to agree upon a specific act committed within a specific time period but was not required to determine exactly when the agreed-upon offense was committed. When the date of the crime is not a material element of the offense charged, it need not be precisely alleged or determined. State v. Miller,
2002 WI App 197
, 257 Wis. 2d. 124,
650 N.W.2d 850
,
01-1406
.
When a defendant is already in custody due to his or her incarceration, the filing of a criminal complaint is sufficient to commence a prosecution. State v. Jennings,
2003 WI 10
,
259 Wis. 2d 523
,
657 N.W.2d 393
,
01-0507
. See also State v. Elverman,
2015 WI App 91
, 366_Wis. 2d 169,
873 N.W.2d 528
,
14-0354
.
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte,
2003 WI 42
,
261 Wis. 2d 249
,
661 N.W.2d 381
,
01-3063
.
When sub. (2) (c) was created in 1987, it only applied prospectively. Subsequent amendments did not change this conclusion because they did not change the initial applicability of sub. (2) (c). Rather, the language in the subsequent amendments, which stated these amendments apply to offenses not yet barred, was clearly meant to apply to offenses that sub. (2) (c) had not already barred. State v. MacArthur,
2008 WI 72
,
310 Wis. 2d 550
,
750 N.W.2d 910
,
06-1379
.
The circuit judge decides the tolling issue under sub. (3) in a pretrial proceeding wherein the state must prove that the defendant was not a public resident by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. MacArthur,
2008 WI 72
,
310 Wis. 2d 550
,
750 N.W.2d 910
,
06-1379
.
A plaintiff's allegations of the defendant district attorney's bad faith presented no impediment to application of the general principle prohibiting federal court interference with pending state prosecutions when the only factual assertion in support of the claim was the district attorney's delay in completing the prosecution, and there were no facts alleged that could support any conclusion other than that the district attorney had acted consistently with state statutes and constitution. Smith v. McCann,
381 F. Supp. 1027
(1974).
The 36-year tolling of the statute of limitations under sub. (3) was not unconstitutional in this case. It did not violate the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, or Equal Protection provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Sub. (3) does not burden a fundamental right, and it is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interests of detecting crimes and apprehending criminals. State v. McGuire,
2010 WI 91
,
328 Wis. 2d 289
;
786 N.W.2d 227
,
07-2711
.
Sub. (2) (a) does not apply to a prosecution for attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which must instead be commenced within six years in accordance with sub. (1). State v. Larson,
2011 WI App 106
,
336 Wis. 2d 419
,
801 N.W.2d 343
,
10-1666
.
Sub. (2) (b) does not impose a requirement on the aggrieved party to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the theft or loss. The one-year extension period in sub. (2) (b) begins to run only when the aggrieved party actually discovers the loss, not when it should have discovered the loss. State v. Simmelink,
2014 WI App 102
,
357 Wis. 2d 430
,
855 N.W.2d 437
,
13-2491
.
When an offense is a continuing offense, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the last act is done that viewed by itself is a crime. Reading ss. 943.20 (1) (a) and 971.36 (3) (a) and (4) together, multiple acts of theft occurring over a period of time may, in certain circumstances, constitute one continuous offense that is not complete until the last act is completed. State v. Elverman,
2015 WI App 91
, 366_Wis. 2d 169,
873 N.W.2d 528
,
14-0354
.
The Perils of Plain Language: Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Assault Defendants. Flynn. Wis. Law. March 2009.
