1979 c. 110
s.
60 (1)
;
1987 a. 332
;
1989 a. 31
;
1995 a. 214
.
The privilege under sub. (3) for public officials acting with apparent authority did not apply to a volunteer fire fighter driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. State v. Schoenheide,
104 Wis. 2d 114
,
310 N.W.2d 650
(Ct. App. 1981).
A foster parent is a “person legally responsible for the child's welfare" under sub. (5). State v. West,
183 Wis. 2d 46
,
515 N.W.2d 484
(Ct. App. 1994).
A mother's live-in boyfriend did not have parental immunity under sub. (5). The boyfriend did not have legal responsibility for the mother's children, and the term “parent" will not be interpreted to include persons
in loco parentis
. State v. Dodd,
185 Wis. 2d 560
,
518 N.W.2d 300
(Ct. App. 1994)
A convicted felon's possession of a firearm is privileged under sub. (6) in limited enumerated circumstances. State v. Coleman,
206 Wis. 2d 199
,
556 N.W.2d 701
(1996),
95-0917
.
The common law privilege to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest is abrogated. State v. Hobson,
218 Wis. 2d 350
,
577 N.W.2d 825
(1998),
96-0914
.
There is no statutory or common law privilege for the crime of carrying a concealed weapon under s. 941.23. State v. Dundon,
226 Wis. 2d 654
,
594 N.W.2d 780
(1999),
97-1423
.
Under the facts of the case, the privilege of self-defense was inapplicable to a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. State v. Nollie,
2002 WI 4
,
249 Wis. 2d 538
,
638 N.W.2d 280
,
00-0744
.
Sub. (6) incorporates excusable homicide by accident or misfortune. Accident is a defense that negatives intent. If a person kills another by accident, the killing could not have been intentional. Accident must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt when a defendant raises it as a defense. When the state proves intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, it necessarily disproves accident. State v. Watkins,
2002 WI 101
,
255 Wis. 2d 265
,
647 N.W.2d 244
,
00-0064
.
A defendant may demonstrate that he or she was acting lawfully, a necessary element of an accident defense, by showing that he or she was acting in lawful self-defense. Although intentionally pointing a firearm at another constitutes a violation of s. 941.20, under s. 939.48 (1) a person is privileged to point a gun at another person in self-defense if the person reasonably believes that the threat of force is necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference. State v. Watkins,
2002 WI 101
,
255 Wis. 2d 265
,
647 N.W.2d 244
,
00-0064
.
To overcome the privilege of parental discipline in sub. (5), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that only one of the following is not met: 1) the use of force must be reasonably necessary; 2) the amount and nature of the force used must be reasonable; and 3) the force used must not be known to cause, or create a substantial risk of, great bodily harm or death. Whether a reasonable person would have believed the amount of force used was necessary and not excessive must be determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the time of the defendant's acts. The standard is what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant's position under the circumstances that existed at the time of the alleged offense. State v. Kimberly B.
2005 WI App 115
,
283 Wis. 2d 731
,
699 N.W.2d 641
,
04-1424
.
Testimony supporting the defendant father's assertion that he was beaten with a belt as a child was not relevant to whether the amount of force he used in spanking his daughter was objectively reasonable. A parent may not abuse his or her child and claim that conduct is reasonable based on his or her history of being similarly abused. State v. Williams,
2006 WI App 212
,
296 Wis. 2d 834
,
723 N.W.2d 719
,
05-2282
.
