Section 971.10. Speedy trial.

 

(1)  In misdemeanor actions trial shall commence within 60 days from the date of the defendant's initial appearance in court.

(2)  

(a) The trial of a defendant charged with a felony shall commence within 90 days from the date trial is demanded by any party in writing or on the record. If the demand is made in writing, a copy shall be served upon the opposing party. The demand may not be made until after the filing of the information or indictment.

(b) If the court is unable to schedule a trial pursuant to par. (a) , the court shall request assignment of another judge pursuant to s. 751.03 .

(3)  

(a) A court may grant a continuance in a case, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, if the ends of justice served by taking action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. A continuance shall not be granted under this paragraph unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

(b) The factors, among others, which the court shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under par. (a) are:

1. Whether the failure to grant the continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice.

2. Whether the case taken as a whole is so unusual and so complex, due to the number of defendants or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this section.

3. The interests of the victim, as defined in s. 950.02 (4) .

(c) No continuance under par. (a) may be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar or the lack of diligent preparation or the failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the state.

(4)  Every defendant not tried in accordance with this section shall be discharged from custody but the obligations of the bond or other conditions of release of a defendant shall continue until modified or until the bond is released or the conditions removed.

1971 c. 40 s. 93 ; 1971 c. 46 , 298 ; 1977 c. 187 s. 135 ; 1979 c. 34 ; 1993 a. 155 ; 1997 a. 181 . A federal court applied balancing test is applicable to review the exercise of a trial court's discretion on a request for the substitution of trial counsel, with the associated request for a continuance. Phifer v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 24 , 218 N.W.2d 354 . A party requesting a continuance on grounds of surprise must show: 1) actual surprise from an unforeseeable development; 2) when surprise is caused by unexpected testimony, the probability of producing contradictory or impeaching evidence; and 3) resulting prejudice if the request is denied. Angus v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 191 , 251 N.W.2d 28 (1977). A delay of 84 days between a defendant's first court appearance and trial on misdemeanor traffic charges was not so inordinate as to raise a presumption of prejudice. State v. Mullis, 81 Wis. 2d 454 , 260 N.W.2d 696 (1978). A stay of proceedings caused by the state's interlocutory appeal stopped the running of the time period under sub. (2). State ex rel. Rabe v. Ferris, 97 Wis. 2d 63 , 293 N.W.2d 151 (1980). Violations of the right to a speedy trial are waived by entry of a guilty plea. State v. Asmus, 2010 WI App 48 , 324 Wis. 2d 427 , 782 N.W.2d 435 , 08-2980 . Following a guilty plea, the defendant could not raise a speedy trial issue. United States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308 (1978).