1979 c. 93
,
102
;
2009 a. 342
.
Under s. 645.32 (1), an order to rehabilitate the business of an insurer "shall appoint the commissioner . . . rehabilitator and shall direct the rehabilitator to take possession of the assets of the insurer and to administer them under the orders of the court." In the context of insurance rehabilitations, a circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion when the circuit court exceeds its statutory authority or the court unreasonably substitutes the rehabilitator's beliefs for its own beliefs. The court will uphold the determinations made by the rehabilitator unless the rehabilitator abused his or her discretion. It is appropriate to afford great weight deference to the commissioner's interpretation and application of the statutes governing the rehabilitation of an insurer and other related statutes the commissioner is charged with administering. Nickel v. Wells Fargo Bank,
2013 WI App 129
,
351 Wis. 2d 539
,
841 N.W.2d 482
,
10-2022
.
The legislature intended for rehabilitation proceedings to be informal and without cumbersome procedures. There is no statutory requirement in ch. 645 providing that a court must specify the facts upon which it relied in approving a rehabilitation plan. Upon submission of a plan for approval, a court "may either approve or disapprove the plan proposed, or may modify it and approve it as modified." Nothing more is required. Nickel v. Wells Fargo Bank,
2013 WI App 129
,
351 Wis. 2d 539
,
841 N.W.2d 482
,
10-2022
.
Wisconsin's rehabilitation statutory scheme does not require that policyholders fare as well in rehabilitation as they would in liquidation. The statutory scheme provides the commissioner with minimal guidance as to how to structure a rehabilitation plan and certainly no requirement that each plan must provide policyholders the liquidation value of their claims or the right to opt out and receive the liquidation value of their claims. Nickel v. Wells Fargo Bank,
2013 WI App 129
,
351 Wis. 2d 539
,
841 N.W.2d 482
,
10-2022
.
The rules of civil procedure, including the rules pertaining to discovery, do not apply to rehabilitation proceedings. Chapter 645 prescribes its own rules of procedure in insurer delinquency proceedings. The legislature did not intend to bind the court to the rules of civil procedure when applying these rules would transform an informal management task into a formal and cumbersome legal task. Nickel v. Wells Fargo Bank,
2013 WI App 129
,
351 Wis. 2d 539
,
841 N.W.2d 482
,
10-2022
.
Sub. (5) provides in broad and liberal terms that after a rehabilitation plan is filed with the circuit court for approval, the court may approve or disapprove the proposed plan, or modify it and approve it as modified after providing "notice and hearing as the court prescribes." This language permits the circuit court to establish procedures that are tailored to the procedural necessities presented by the circumstances of each rehabilitation proceeding. That means that the rehabilitation court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to intervene. Nickel v. Wells Fargo Bank,
2013 WI App 129
,
351 Wis. 2d 539
,
841 N.W.2d 482
,
10-2022
.